Colluding Tags Attack on the ECC-based Grouping Proofs for Rfids by Abyaneh, Mohammad Reza Sohizadeh
C O L L U D I N G TA G S AT TA C K O N T H E
E C C - B A S E D G R O U P I N G P R O O F S F O R
R F I D S
Mohammad Reza Sohizadeh Abyaneh∗
Abstract. Recently, a new privacy-preserving elliptic curve
based grouping proof protocol with colluding tag preven-
tion(CTP) has been proposed. The CTP protocol is claimed
to be resistant against colluding tags attacks in which the in-
volved tags can exchange some messages via another reader
before the protocol starts without revealing their private
keys.
In this paper, we show that the CTP protocol is vulnera-
ble to some colluding tag attacking scenario. In addition,
we propose a new elliptic curve based grouping protocol
which can fix the problem. Our proposal is based on a for-
mally proved privacy preserving authentication protocol
and has the advantage of being resistant against colluding
tags attacks with the same amount of computation.
Keywords: RFID, Grouping Proofs, Elliptic Curve, Privacy.
1 IN T R O D U C T I O N
In 2004, Juels [1] proposed a new security notion called Yoking Proofs.
The proposed scheme enables the generation of a proof which shows
that a pair of RFID tags are scanned simultaneously by a reader. Yoking
proofs were later generalized to grouping proofs which indicates that
multiple tags participate in the generation of a proof [2, 8].
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By adopting grouping proofs, the manufacturer can prove to its cus-
tomers that the referred products are sold at the same time. For example
in a pharmacy store, some drugs must be sold according to the recipe.
For inpatients, the medical staffs can guarantee the authentication and
integrity of a group of medical items like inpatient bracelets and the
containers of drugs [6]. For car industry, a grouping proof ensures that
all components of a car are assembled in the same factory [1, 9].
Recently, Batina et al have proposed a new privacy-preserving ellip-
tic curve based grouping-proof protocol with colluding tag prevention
(denoted by CTP protocol)[13]. The protocol is claimed to be resistant
against all active attacks applied on the previous grouping proof proto-
cols and also fulfil the privacy against a narrow-strong adversary. The
notion of the CTP protocol is mainly derived from the latest version of
their elliptic curve based authentication protocols called EC-RAC III
[20].
Remark1. With elliptic curve cryptography emerging as a serious al-
ternative, the desired level of security can be attained with significantly
smaller key sizes. This makes ECC very attractive for devices with
limited computational capabilities. On the feasibility of implementing
ECC on RFID tags, one may argue that it is too heavy to be deployed
on low-cost tags such as EPCglobal Class-1 Generation-2 standard tags.
Nevertheless, there have been many proposals so far such as [13–17].
Our Contribution. In this paper, we present a colluding attack against
the CTP protocol. We show that two colluding tags are able to complete
a run of the CTP protocol successfully and generate a valid grouping
proof with the presence of only one of the tags. Then, we propose a
new grouping proof protocol based on elliptic curves which fixes the
problem.
Outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we describe the CTP protocol and its security claims, then
Section 3 presents a colluding attack scenario against the CTP protocol.
In order to fix the problem, a new grouping protocol is proposed in Sec-
tion 4 with its security analysis. In Section 5, we compare our proposal
with the CTP protocol from security and computation perspectives and
finally Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 THE CTP PROTOCOL
In this section, we describe the CTP protocol. But first we explain the
notations and assumptions used hereafter.
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• P: Elliptic curve base point.
• TA, TB: Tag A and tag B respectively.
• R: Reader.
• V: Verifier.
• y, Y = yP: Verifier’s private and public keys respectively.
• sa, sb: Tag A and tag B’s private keys respectively.
• x(T): x-coordinate of point T on the elliptic curve.
• PAB : grouping proof of tag A and tag B.
2 .1 AS S U M P T I O N S
It should be noted that the CTP protocol is executed under following
assumptions:
• There are three entities involved in the protocol: some tags, a
reader and a verifier.
• The task of the reader is to coordinate the execution of the protocol,
collect the grouping proof and forward it to the verifier. The reader
is not necessarily trusted by the tags or the verifier.
• The verifier is trusted and the public-key Y of the verifier is a
publicly known system parameter. Only the verifier knows the
corresponding private-key y.
• Knowledge of y is a necessary requirement to check the correct-
ness of a grouping proof. The result of a verification claim is
failure, or it reveals the identities of the involved tags.
• It is hard to solve the Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem, i.e. given
P and aP in Elliptic Curve with a randomly chosen in Zq =
[0, q− 1], it is hard to compute a.
• It is hard to solve the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem,
i.e. given P, aP, bP with a and b randomly chosen in Zq and given
cP = abP with probability 12 and cP = dP with probability
1
2 with
d randomly chosen in Zq, it is hard to decide whether abP equals
cP .
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2.2 DE S C R I P T I O N
Without loss of generality, we explain the two-party version of the CTP
protocol. This protocol can be easily extended to more than two tags as
described in [13].
The two-party version of the CTP protocol is shown in Fig.1. The reader
initiates the interrogation by sending the messages "start left” to one of
the tags (TA). Then, TA generates a random number ra and computes
its corresponding Elliptic curve point (Ta,1 = raP) and sends it back to
the reader. The reader then initiates a simultaneous interrogation with
another tag (TB) by transmitting the "start right” message following
by a random challenge generated by the reader rs and Ta,1 received
from TA. TB computes Tb,1 = rbP and Tb,2 = (rb + x(rsTa,1)sb)Y. Then,
both of the generated messages are transmitted to the reader. The
reader passes Tb,2 to TA and the protocol concludes by transmission of
Ta,2 = (ra + x(Tb,2)sa)Y from TA to the reader.
The grouping proof, collected by the reader, consists of the tuple in (1).
PAB = {Ta,1, Ta,2, rs, Tb,1, Tb,2} (1)
This tuple is sent to the verifier to verify the grouping proof constructed
by TA and TB. The verifier checks whether the following equations hold.
Sa = saP = (y−1Ta,2 − Ta,1)x(Tb,2)−1 (2)
Sb = sbP = (y−1Tb,2 − Tb,1)x(rsTa,1)−1 (3)
where Sa and Sb are the public keys of TA and TB respectively and are
registered in the database of the verifier. If so, the grouping proof is
accepted.
2 .3 SE C U R I T Y CL A I M S
Due to its construction, the CTP grouping-proof protocol is claimed
to inherit the security properties of the EC-RAC III authentication
protocol [20]. The EC-RAC III latter is designed to provide secure entity
authentication against an active adversary, and was informally shown
to be equivalent to the Schnorr protocol [18].
The security claims on the CTP protocol can be divided into to two
different security issues, Privacy and Forgery prevention of the grouping
proof.
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Tag A Reader Tag B
sa sb
"start left”←−−−−−−−−−−−
ra ∈R Zq
Ta,1=ra P−−−−−−−−−−−→
rs ∈R Zq
"start right”,rs ,Ta,1
−−−−−−−−−−−→
rb ∈R Zq
Tb,1=rbP←−−−−−−−−−−−−
Tb,2=(rb+x(rsTa,1)sb)Y
Tb,2←−−−−−−−−−−−
Ta,2=(ra+x(Tb,2)sa)Y−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 1: Two-party version of the CTP protocol
2.3 .1 PR I VA C Y
In [22], Vaudenay has presented a classification of privacy in RFID sys-
tems. Vaudenay’s model defines eight classes of adversarial capabilities.
These capabilities are in two orthogonal parts:
1. Four different types of tag corruptions: strong, forward, destructive
and weak.
2. Two modes of observations: wide and narrow.
Referring to this classification, the CTP protocol is claimed to be narrow-
strong private, although no formal proof for this is given in the original
paper. This claim has been recently invalidated [23]. However, verifica-
tion of this claim has not been addressed in this paper.
2 .3 .2 FO R G E RY PR E V E N T I O N
Being a grouping proof protocol, the CTP must prevent the generation of
a valid grouping proof without the involved tags actually participating
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in the protocol. This implies that the protocol must resist against the
following potential attack scenarios:
• Compromised tag: One tag is compromised, the reader is non-
compromised.
• Man-in-the-middle attack: The reader is compromised (the tags are
honest).
• Colluding reader and tag: The reader and one of the tags are com-
promised.
• Colluding tags: The reader is non-compromised, both tags are com-
promised. The tags can exchange some messages in advance (e.g.,
via another reader), but do not know each other’s private key.
• Replay attack performed by an outsider: An eavesdropper scans two
non-compromised tags simultaneously and replays the copied
message-flow to impersonate the two tags.
The CTP protocol is claimed to be resistant against the impersonation
of a tag in all of the above attack scenarios. Namely,an adversary needs
to either know the private-key of that particular tag or be able to solve
the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem to impersonate it in this
protocol. This claim has been addressed through this paper and an
attack, which negates this claim, will be described in the next section.
3 OU R C O L L U D I N G TA G S AT TA C K
In this section, we elaborate an attacking scenario against the CTP pro-
tocol. In our attack, we take the colluding tags scenario which implies
that the reader is trusted, but both tags are compromised, and tags can
exchange some messages in advance (e.g. via another reader), but they
do not know each other’s private key.
Our attacking scenario is divided into two phases: conspiracy phase and
deceit phase. In the conspiracy phase, the two tags secretly negotiate
via a rogue reader (Reader*). In this negotiation, as Figure 2 shows, one
of the tags (e.g. tag B) sends H = sbY to tag A. H is the point multipli-
cation operation of tag B’s private key (sb) and verifier’s public key (Y)
on the Elliptic Curve group. It should be mentioned that message H
does not reveal any information on sb due to discrete logarithm (DL)
problem.
126
Colluding Tags Attack on the ECC-based Grouping Proofs for RFIDs
Tag A Reader* Tag B
sa sb
H=sbY←−−−−−−−−−−−
H←−−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 2: Phase I: Conspiracy Phase
Having H known, tag A is able to impersonate tag B in the CTP
protocol.
Figure 3 shows the detail of a successful completion of the CTP
protocol run with inclusion of only one of the tags. The only message
of the CTP protocol, which includes tag B’s private key, is Tb,2 which
can be easily forged by (5) if a tag accesses H.
Tb,2 = (rb + x(rsTa,1)sb)Y (4)
Tb,2 = (rbY + x(rsTa,1)sbY) = (rbY + x(rsTa,1)H) (5)
As it can be seen, knowing H = sbY is adequate to impersonate tag B
in the CTP protocol without revealing any information about its private
key sb.
4 PR O P O S E D PR O TO C O L
In Section 3, we showed that the CTP protocol is vulnerable to some
colluding tags attacks. In this section, we propose a new scheme based
on elliptic curve notion with the same security level from privacy per-
spective but resistant against colluding attacks from forgery prevention
perspective.
4 .1 DE S C R I P T I O N
Our proposal is based on an authentication protocol proposed by
Bringer et al. called "Randomized Schnorr”(Figure 4 [19]. This protocol
has been formally proved to be narrow-strong private.
The two-party version of our proposed protocol is shown in Figure 5.
The reader initiates the interrogation by sending the messages "start left”
to one of the tags (TA). Then, TA generates two random numbers αa and
βa and computes their point multiplication on P and Y Elliptic curve
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Tag A Reader Tag A
sa sa
"start left”←−−−−−−−−−−−
ra ∈R Zq
Ta,1=ra P−−−−−−−−−−−→
rs ∈R Zq
"start right”,rs ,Ta,1
−−−−−−−−−−−→
rb ∈R Zq
Tb,1=rbP←−−−−−−−−−−−
Tb,2=rbY+x(rsTa,1)H
Tb,2←−−−−−−−−−−−
Ta,2=(ra+x(Tb,2)sa)Y−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 3: Phase II: Deceit Phase
Tag Reader
s, I = sP P, υP υ
α, β ∈R Zq
T1=αP−−−−−−−−−−−→
T2=βυP
c ∈R Zq
y = α+ β+ sc mod q
y
−−−−−−−−−−−→
Check whether
I = c−1(yP− T1 − υ−1T2)
Fig. 4: Randomized Schnorr protocol
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8
right” message following by a random challenge generated by the reader rs and
Ta,2 received from TA. TB computes Tb,1 = αbP and Tb,2βbY , the same as TA
did. In addition, it also generates a scalar number tb,3 = (αb + βb + x(rsTa,2)sb)
mod q. Then, all of the three generated messages are transmitted to the reader.
The reader passes tb,3 to TA and the protocol concludes by transmission of scalar
ta,3 = αa + βa + tb,3sa from TA to the reader. The grouping proof, collected by
the reader, consists of the tuple (6).
PAB = {Ta,1, Ta,2, Ta,3, rs, Tb,1, Tb,2, Tb,3} (6)
To verify the grouping proof constructed by TA and TB , the verifier checks
whether the Equations (7) and (8) hold.
Sa = saP = x
−1(Tb,3)(ta,3P − Ta,1 − y−1Ta,2) (7)
Sb = sbP = x
−1(rsTa,2)(tb,3P − Tb,1 − y−1Tb,2) (8)
Tag A Reader Tag B
sa sb
”start left”
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
αa, βa ∈R Zq
Ta,1=αaP
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Ta,2=βaY
rs ∈R Zq
”start right”,rs,Ta,2
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
αb, βb ∈R Zq
Tb,1=αbP, Tb,2=βbY
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
tb,3=(αb+βb+x(rsTa,2)sb) mod q
tb,3
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
ta,3=αa+βa+tb,3sa mod q
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 5. Proposed grouping protocol
4.2 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of our protocol in the same security
framework used for the CTP protocol.
Fig. 5: Proposed grouping protocol
points respectively (Ta,1 = αaP, Ta,2 = βaY ) and sends it to the reader
in return. The reader then initiates a simultaneous interrogation with
another tag (TB) by transmi ting the "start right” message following
by a random challenge generated by the reader rs and Ta,2 received
from TA. TB computes Tb,1 = αbP and Tb,2βbY, the same as TA did. In
addition, it also generates a scalar number tb,3 = (αb + βb + x(rsTa,2)sb)
mod q. Then, all of the three generated messages are transmitted to
the reader. The reader passes tb,3 to TA and the protocol concludes by
transmission of scalar ta,3 = αa + βa + tb,3sa from TA to the reader. The
grouping proof, collected by the reader, consists of the tuple (6).
PAB = {Ta,1, Ta,2, Ta,3, rs, Tb,1, Tb,2, Tb,3} (6)
To verify the grouping proof constructed by TA and TB, the verifier
checks whether the Equations (7) and (8) hold.
Sa = saP = x−1(Tb,3)(ta,3P− Ta,1 − y−1Ta,2) (7)
Sb = sbP = x−1(rsTa,2)(tb,3P− Tb,1 − y−1Tb,2) (8)
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4.2 SE C U R I T Y AN A LY S I S
In this section, we analyze the security of our protocol in the same
security framework used for the CTP protocol.
4 .2 .1 PR I VA C Y
Theorem 1. Assume the hardness of the DDH problem, then Randomized
Schnorr is narrow-strong private.
Proof : [19]
Theorem 2. Assume that the Randomized Schnorr is narrow-strong pri-
vate, our proposed protocol is privacy-preserving against narrow-strong ad-
versary.
Proof : As explained, to prove the privacy, it is necessary to prove
that we can simulate the tags outputs. In the following, we construct a
simulation and we show that an adversary who is able to distinguish
between this simulation and the outputs of genuine tags in the proposed
protocol will be able to do the same for the Randomized Schnorr
protocol.
The outputs of the tags in the proposed are as following:
TA: Ta,1 = αaP, Ta,2 = βaY, ta,3 = αa + βa + tb,3sa
TB: Tb,1 = αbP, Tb,2 = βbY, tb,3 = (αb + βb + x(rsTa,2)sb)
The outputs of each tag is easily mapped on the outputs of a generic tag
in the Randomized Schnorr protocol, namely T1 = αP, T2 = βυP, y =
α+ β+ sc. In other words, the proposed protocol is simply two runs
of the Randomized Schnorr protocol regarding the tags outputs. This
simply proves the privacy attribute inheritance of the proposed protocol
from the Randomized Schnorr protocol.
4 .2 .2 FO R G E RY PR E V E N T I O N
Theorem 3. Assume the Schnorr scheme is secure against active imperson-
ation attacks, then Randomized Schnorr is secure against active imperson-
ation attacks.
Proof : [19]
Theorem 4. Assume the randomized Schnorr scheme is secure against
active impersonation attacks, then our proposed protocol is secure against
active impersonation attacks.
Proof : It is obvious that interrogation of TA in the proposed protocol
is a complete run of the Randomized Schnorr protocol and inherits
the security attribute of the Randomized Schnorr protocol stated in
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Theorem 3. The interrogation of TB, however, is slightly different from
a normal run of the Randomized Schnorr protocol. So, in our proof we
focus on the right part of the protocol runs between the reader and TB.
In order to proof the theorem, we devise a proof by contradiction ap-
proach. Assume there exists an active adversary A against the proposed
protocol. Given a system of tags T and a reader executing the Ran-
domized Schnorr protocol, we transform the tags’ normal outputs to
simulate tags’ outputs in the proposed protocol. So doing, we convert
A into an adversary against the Randomized Schnorr protocol.
First, when A interrogates TB, she sends rs and Ta,2 to the tag. We
intercept this message. Then, tag outputs T1 = Tb,1 and T2 = Ta,2. We
intercept these two messages and send back c = x(rsTa,2) to the tag.
The tag responses y = (αb + βb + csb). We forward this message to the
adversary as tb,3 = y. Clearly, from A’s point of view, TA is using the
proposed protocol.
Now, A tries to impersonate TB by interacting with the reader. First,
we pick a random number r′s and one random Elliptic curve point
T′a,2 and send them to A. As A is able to impersonate TB against
the proposed protocol then she is able to compute a couple tuple
T′b,1 = α
′
bP, T
′
b,2 = β
′
bY and t
′
b,3 = (α
′
b + β
′
b + x(r
′
sT′a,2)s′b) on receiv-
ing the challenges such that there exists an Sb verifying S′b = s
′
bP =
x−1(rsTa,2)(tb,3P− Tb,1 − y−1Tb,2).
For this reason, we are able to uniquely compute T1 and T2, to receive
a challenge c and to compute y such that there exists an I with I =
c−1(yP− T1 − υ−1T2). In this way, we showed that by using A, we are
able to impersonate TB against the Randomized Schnorr protocol which
negates our assumption.
One can demonstrate that to impersonate a tag in either of the attack
scenarios stated in Section 2.3, the adversary needs to know the private-
key of that particular tag (or be able to solve the DDH problem).
5 CO M PA R I S O N
Table 2 summarizes the comparison between the CTP and our proposed
protocol in terms of security and computation.
Security wise, our proposed protocol has accomplished to yield the
same but formally proved privacy level and higher security from forgery
prevention perspective, due to formally proved resistance against the
colluding tags attack.
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Security Computation
Privacy Forgery # of EC point # of EC point
Prevention multiplications multiplications
for the verifier for each tag
CTP narrow-strong Not Secure 4 2
(Not formally proved)
Proposed narrow-strong 6 2
Protocol (Formally proved) Secure
Table 1. Comparison of the CTP protocol and the proposed protocol
multiplication of its private key and the verifier’s public key. As this point mul-
tiplication does not reveal any information about the tag’s private key, it can be
exploited by colluding tags to generate a grouping proof with presence of only
one of the tags.
In order to fix this problem, we proposed a new grouping protocol based on el-
liptic curves which prevents the colluding attacks and proved its security proper-
ties. In Summary, compared to the CTP protocol, our proposal has the following
properties:
– Formally provable narrow-strong privacy.
– Formally provable prevention against forged proof generation.
– The same amount of computational overhead on tag sides.
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• Formally provable narrow-strong privacy.
• Formally provable prevention against forged proof generation.
• The same amount of computational overhead on tag sides.
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